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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
other states will react to this spotlight on the gap in review pro-
cedure when there is no fair hearing below remains to be seen.
J. McK.
CitMnuAL LAw-ATrFr To RECEIVE STOLEN PROPERTY-FACT
THAT PRoPERTY WAs No LONGER STOLEN HE=D IMmATERIAL.-Six
automobile tires were stolen but were recovered by the police.
Upon being advised by one of the thieves that he was in the process
of taking the tires to sell to a certain service station operator, the
arresting officer suggested that he proceed with his plan and com-
plete the sale. This was done and the service station operator was
charged with an attempt to receive stolen property. In seeking a
writ of prohibition, D, the service station operator, argued that the
property was no longer stolen, since it had been recovered from the
thieves, and therefore an essential element of the crime was missing.
Held, even assuming that the character of the property had been
changed from "stolen" to "recovered" (and that therefore prosecu-
tion for receiving stolen property would not lie), defendant had
attempted to receive stolen property when he purchased the tires
believing them to have been stolen and with an intent to keep them
from the true owner. Faustina v. Superior Court, 345 P.2d 542
(Calif. 1959).
The problem of impossibility in the principal case is one small
facet of the field of criminal attempts. An analysis of this facet, out
of context, would be impractical-indeed, to take such an approach
would be to succumb to the procedure which will be criticized in
this comment. Rather, the analysis will cover the entire area of
criminal attempts.
The courts have failed to recognize, and they have become
victims of, the elusive irony of the law of attempts. They have
divorced the attempt to commit a crime from the crime attempted
and have joined all the myriad forms of attempt into a single body
of substantive law, disregarding the dissimilarities among the indi-
vidual attempts. Any law that deals with intent and the workings
of the human mind without physical consummation is intrinsically
subjective. In reducing all attempts to a unified body of law the
courts have thus striven to catalogue elements of mental and moral
manifestations that defy codification by our limited human methods.
It follows that the most patently insignificant misdemeanors con-
stitute the least comprehended and least satisfactorily resolved field
of criminal law.
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Inasmuch as a science is a systematic body of knowledge con-
cerning a certain field, perhaps the denomination "social science"
without more is misleading. The degree of precision and accuracy
in any systematic body of knowledge is directly contingent upon
the subject matter under consideration. And the "social sciences"
have as the focal point of their explorations the most unpredictable
element in the temporal order-free human acts. At the most, there-
fore, a social science especially must be qualified as a relatively
systematic body of knowledge.
With this qualification in mind it may be said that jurispru-
dence ranks high, if not highest, in accuracy when compared with
its social science brethren. But students of the law are well aware
of the rather common misconception that the law closely parallels,
sometimes equals, and on rare occasion even surpasses the pre-
cision of the natural sciences. That it strives for this precision can
neither be denied nor declared anathema. Yet it should always be
borne in mind that the nature of the subject for which the law was
created and upon which the law operates necessarily dictates a
high degree of mutability and relativity in its practical application.
The underpinning thesis of this discussion is that the field of
criminal attempts has defied general elucidation because of the
natural scientific inclination of the courts; that the attempted em-
ployment of natural scientific methodology has made categorization
an end in itself, rather that a means to the end of clarity and facility
in the use of the law; that this is one area of the law where it may
be said that, without imperatives, a spade is still called an agricul-
tural instrument.
That criminal attempts pose some of the most vexatious prob-
lems of the law does not admit of doubt. It is a rare discussion of
the area that does not include some sort of apologia of which the
following are illustrative:
It has been truly said by a philosophical writer that "the
subject of criminal attempt, though it presses itself upon the
attention wherever we walk through the fields of the criminal
law, is very obscure in the books, and apparently not well
understood either by the text-writers or the judges." And it
may be added that it is more intricate and difficult of com-
prehension than any other branch of the criminal law. Hicks v.
Commonwealth, 86 Va. 228, 226, 9 S.E. 1024, 1025 (1889).
And again:
This doctrine of attempt to commit a substantive crime is one
of the most important, and at the same time most intricate, titles
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of the criminal law.. . . there is no title, indeed, less under-
stood by the courts, or more obscure in the text books than that
of attempts. Cunningham v. State, 49 Miss. 685, 701 (1874).
No small number of scholars have searched for the rationale
of the confusion, but very few have come up with satisfactory
explanations. More common has been a cure at least as unintel-
ligible as the illness. For a recent example see Smith, Two Problems
In Criminal Attempts, 70 Harv. L. REv. 422 (1957). Although it
is usually dangerous to deal in superlatives, the writer feels that
the most incisive analysis of this problem was made some thirty
years ago. See Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an
Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930). It would be the height of
academic pretention to deny reliance upon the ideas of such a dis-
tinguished legal mind.
Legal problems are often spoken of as confused under two
different sets of circumstances: a. where courts have done incon-
sistent things with similar fact situations and, b. where courts have
tried to make the same rule cover utterly incongruous situations. It
is in the latter area that our problem is found. A few examples
will suffice.
In Hicks v. Commonwealth, supra, D had purchased poison,
delivered it to a third party, and asked that party to place the
poison in the coffee of the intended victim. The court, in discussing
the charge of attempting to poison with intent to kill, thought it
meet to compare the case with People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159 (1859).
The latter case involved an indictment for attempting to contract
an incestuous marriage where the defendant had eloped with his
niece and sent for a magistrate to perform the ceremony. The
conviction for the attempted incestuous marriage was reversed on
the theory that the defendant had not gone beyond acts of prepara-
tion.
Indeed, the Murray case has been used so frequently that at
first blush it appears to be a panacea for almost all problems of
criminal attempt. Thus it was used: to absolve a defendant indicted
for unlawful attempt to manufacture liquors where defendant had
collected barrels and other paraphernalia; in a suit on an accident
insurance policy where it was held that hunting prairie chickens
with a loaded gun is not attempting to kill them; to save a defendant
from conviction for an assault with a sharp and dangerous weapon;
in cases involving murder in connection with attempted burglary,
conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses, lewd acts, pandering,
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attempts to assist in an escape from jail-the list could apparently
go on ad infinitum.
In Cunningham v. State, supra, the defendant had given X
money, unlawfully to induce a witness to absent himself from court.
To resolve the problem, raised by the indictment for attempting to
obstruct and impede the administration of justice, the court referred
to: a. the evidence in a case where D offered money to another
person to set fire to a barn and furnished him matches; b. indict-
ments for the possession of forged bank bills; c. a case involving
the form of an indictment for an attempt at larceny, and d. cases
where a request to commit adultery was held not to be indictable.
These analytical patterns have been followed in case after case
involving criminal attempts.
The scholars and judges tell us that this method is used in order
to find the attributes by which an attempt per se may be recognized.
This operates on the spurious and fatal assumption that it is desira-
ble to consider attempts without regard to the particular crime
attempted. Traces of this assumption are found in the late 18th
century, Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 897 (1784), but the early 19th cen-
tury case of Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5 (1801) gave it definite shape.
Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARv. L. REv. 821 (1928).
Earlier cases in the field justified conviction for an attempted
crime by the doctrine, voluntas reputatur pro facto, or, the intention
is to be taken for the deed. 2 STEPimN, HIsroRY OF CnIMnAL LAW
oF ENGLAND 222 (1888). Of course, this was not punishment for
mere intent alone, away from which the positive law properly
moved, feeling that the fixing of guilt through evil intent alone was
the province of the omniscient Judge perfectly administering the
moral order. The application of the doctrine was simply a recogni-
tion of the power of the courts to extend the policy of a given rule
prohibting a crime to certain acts which had failed to achieve the
prohibited result. Such an application necessitated a consideration
of the criminality of an attempt in light of the particular crime
attempted. Had this approach been continued, "An examination
of the rule prohibiting the substantive crime would have been our
only guide in determining how far conduct which failed of that
result should be punished." Arnold, supra, at 59.
But 19th century jurisprudence refused to let well enough alone.
It was appalling that the courts should be able to extend the limits
of substantive crimes through the exercise of a certain limited dis-
cretionary power. Surely a greater degree of precision could be
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achieved by making attempt itself a substantive crime. Once this
course was adopted, it became necessary to search for the limits
and elements of such substantive crime and the dichotomy was
complete-the substantive crime of attempt was to have its own
earmarks without reference to the crime attempted.
Thus grew up a large body of legal niceties concerning the
limits within which crimes might be attempted and the elements of
such attempt. Divergent theories emanated from such general rules
as the following: any attempt to commit any crime is a substan-
tive offense amounting to a common law misdemeanor. Beale,
Criminal Attempts, 16 HxAv. L. REv. 491 (1903). Then, distinc-
tions followed: a. if the offense was a misdemeanor which was
"malum prohibitum," "purely statutory," or "not malicious," an at-
tempt to commit it would not be criminal; b. there could be no
attempt to commit an attempt; c. some acts were criminal because
of their consequences and others because of their surrounding cir-
cumstances-an act being defined as a willed muscular contraction;
d. the distinctions were made between direct and relative attempts;
between assault and attempt; and between solicitation and attempt.
Elements of an attempt were usually: a. the specific intent to
commit the crime with its concomitants of subjective and objective
intent, intent inferred from conduct, and intent inferred from the
presumption that a man intends the reasonable and probable con-
sequences of his acts; b. the performance of an act toward the ac-
complishment of the crime, wherein the means used must be reason-
ably adapted to the end, and which act must go beyond mere
preparation; c. the failure to complete the crime intended which
leads to the obvious problem of determining just what exactly does
amount to sufficient failure for criminality to attach.
The core and the ramifications of the problem are thus clearly
identified-the consideration of attempt as a substantive crime apart
from the particular crime attempted and the resultant application
of general rules to completely dissimilar situations, which applica-
tion is inherent in the method of analysis.
To speak of the law of criminal attempts as a classified set of
rules describing the elements of any crime or covering any given
conduct is to perpetuate the aimless wanderings of the courts. Why
not speak of this law as a discretionary power of the courts, given
by the legislature or common law precedent, ". . . to extend the
limits of prohibitions against certain kinds of conduct to conduct
which does not quite fall within the terms of those prohibitions."?
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Arnold, supra, at 74. Mr. Arnold states that this power is analogous
to the power which courts have possessed in the field known as
common law crimes.
The law of common law crimes is regarded as a tool with
which courts are free to fill up omissions in criminal codes. "The
law of criminal attempts is exactly the same kind of a thing....
it simply means that courts are permitted to fill in the gaps which a
set of definitions inevitably leave when applied to human con-
dut.... To treat this power as the definition of a substantive
crime is either to destroy it or hopelessly to confuse it." Arnold,
supra, at 75.
And what of our original concept of scientific precision? To
speak of precision in an area where judicial discretion is the gov-
erning force is futile. But strivings for scientific precision in the
law of criminal attempts have produced results which are the
diametric opposite of the accuracy desired. To try the rule of
judicial discretion could certainly produce nothing worse and there
is a good chance for something a great deal better.
E. P. K.
CRnnNAI LAw- FoRGERY - UsE OF FicrrTous OR AsS ED
NAME.-Having established himself as one "R. E. Spaine," a ficti-
tious person, D gave a check payable to the G Hotel, drawn on the
X Co., and signed "R. E. Spaine," to the hotel manager. The check
was to pay his bill at the hotel where he had registered twice within
a month under the fictitious name; he received the balance in cash.
D had no account in the X Co. The check was transported in inter-
state commerce. D was convicted for violation of a federal statute
making it a crime to cause a falsely made and forged security to
be transported in interstate commerce, knowing the instrument to
have been falsely made and forged. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (Supp. 1958).
Held, sustaining the conviction, where D assumes a name and in
addition uses that name to create a fictional person with real char-
acteristics, personality and identity, the use of that name as an
instrument of fraud is as much a forgery as though the fictional
person were real. Edge v. United States, 270 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.
1959).
Two views of forgery have been expounded by the federal
courts in an effort to establish the law on this subject. Under the
"broad" view, if an instrument is sufficiently valid on its face to
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